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Using Emergency Powers to Provide
Financial Assistance to Coal and Nuclear Plants
James M. Van Nostrand*
INTRODUCTION
During his presidential campaign, Donald Trump promised
"to bring the coal jobs back" in a speech in Charleston, West
Virginial-a commitment he would repeat during the remainder of
his campaign. Since taking office, President Trump has pressed
Secretary of Energy, Rick Perry, to develop a strategy for providing
financial assistance for the coal industry.2 For different reasons,
the Trump Administration has also pushed for financial relief for
nuclear plants.3
Both of these fuels for generating electricity have suffered
in recent years from their inability to compete in the competitive
wholesale power markets throughout the United States, resulting
in the closure or planned retirement of dozens of units. In the PJM
wholesale capacity market (a regional organization that
coordinates the movement of electricity throughout the Mid-
Atlantic), for example, neither coal nor nuclear plants have been
"in the money" in the periodic auctions to provide generating
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School of Law, Pace University; J.D., University of Iowa College of Law; M.A., Economics,
SUNY at Albany; B.A. Economics, University of Northern Iowa. The author expresses his
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I See David Gutman, Trump Rallies in Charleston, Tells People Not to Vote,
CHARLESTON GAZETTE-MAIL (May 5, 2016), https://www.wvgazettemail.comlnews/pol-
tics/trump-rallies-in-charleston-tells-people-not-to-vote/article e
9 ae4 6 lf-543a-546b-be9b-
0d928d719f7c.html [https://perma.cc/9FSW-ZRQ7].
2 See John Bowden & Timothy Cama, Trump Orders Rick Perry to Take 'Immedi-
ate Steps' to Stop Coal Plant Closures, THE HILL (June 1, 2018), https://thehill.comlpol-
icy/energy-environment/390270-trump-orders-perry-to-take-immediate-steps-to-stop-coal-
plant [https://perma.cc/G3RB-WM521.
3 See id.
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capacity to the market.4 Compounding their inability to capture
revenues in the capacity market, the decline in energy prices has
resulted in coal and nuclear plants failing to produce enough
revenues for their owners to keep them in operation.5 Between
2002 and 2016, 531 coal-generating units-representing about 61
gigawatts (GWs) of generation capacity-retired from the U.S.
generation fleet.6 In the PJM region alone, more than twenty-five
GW of coal-fired generation will have deactivated between 2011
and 2020, based on formally submitted deactivation plans.7 The
nuclear industry has fared no better: from 2002 to 2016,
approximately 4.7 GW of nuclear-generating capacity,
representing about 4.7 percent of the U.S. total, went offline.8
Since 2016, another eight nuclear units, representing an
additional 7.2 percent of nuclear capacity in the U.S., have
announced retirement.9
In response, several proposals have been offered to provide
financial relief to the coal and nuclear industries. The most recent
proposal was set forth in an unofficial forty-page memorandum
from the Department of Energy (DOE Military Proposal), which
was "leaked" to the press on May 29, 2018.10 This Proposal would,
among other things, create a strategic electric generation reserve
on the grounds of national security interests by creating a category
of subject generation facilities-unspecified coal and nuclear
plants-the output from which would be required to be purchased
by grid operators in the course of two years." The DOE Military
Proposal is only the latest of several proposals offered by the coal
See Robert Walton, New Coal Nuclear Generation Would Have Lost Money Last
Year, PJM Monitor Says, UTILITY DIVE (Mar. 8, 2018), https://www.utili-
tydive.com/news/new-coal-nuclear-generation-would-have-lost-money-last-year-pjm-moni-
tor-s/518746/ [https://permacclRE7M-7FKM].
5 See Jennifer A. Dlouhy, Trump Prepares Lifeline for Money Losing Coal Plants,
BLOOMBERG (May 31, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-06-01/trump-
said-to-grant-lifeline-to-money-losing-coal-power-plants-jhv94ghl [https://perma.cc/8MAG-
K53H.
, U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, STAFF REPORT TO THE SECRETARY ON ELECTRICITY MAR-
KETS AND RELIABILITY 22 [hereinafter DOE STAFF REPORT] (Aug. 2017) (asserting "Between
2002 and 2016, 531 coal generating units representing approximately 59,00 MW of genera-
tion capacity retired from the U.S. generation fleet").
7 North American Electric Reliability Corporation, 2017 Long-Term Reliability
Assessment, 58 (2017).
8 DOE STAFF REPORT, supra note 6, at 29.
9 Id. at 30.
1o See id.
" Id. at 3.
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industry and the Trump Administration to provide financial relief
for the coal and nuclear industries.12
Section II of this Comment will examine the elements of
and the basis for the DOE Military Proposal, as well as related
proposals that have been offered over the past two years with the
purpose of providing financial relief for the coal and nuclear
industries. Section III will explore the legal authority upon which
the DOE Military Proposal is based and any applicable precedent
under that authority. Section IV of this Comment will examine the
likely financial impact of the DOE Military Proposal if it is
implemented. Finally, Section V will offer some observations and
conclusions on the use of emergency powers as the basis for
providing financial relief to the coal and nuclear industries.
II. PROPOSALS ADDRESSING THE FINANCIAL CONDITION OF COAL
AND NUCLEAR INDUSTRIES
A. The DOE Military Proposal
As noted above, the DOE Military Proposal was never
formally introduced or acted upon; the elements of the proposal,
however, can be discerned from an "addendum" draft dated
May 29, 2018, that was published in a number of media outlets.
1 3
As the basis for the DOE's exercise of its emergency authority over
electric generating resources, the Proposal cites several factors:
* Increased reliance on natural gas for electricity
generation and the "limits of protection" available for
the thousands of miles of natural gas pipelines;
* The distinction between "reliability" and "resilience,"
which suggests that "fuel-secure" generating stations-
including nuclear and coal-fired power plants, as well as
oil-fired and dual-fuel units with adequate storage-
provide a greater ability to withstand, and quickly
recover from, high-impact events;
I2 See id. at 1-3.
13 See, e.g., Cooper McKim, Leaked Memo Shows a Plan to Bailout Coal and Nu-
clear, WY. PUB. MEDIA (Jun. 12, 2018), https://www.wyomingpublicmedia.org/post/leaked-
memo-shows-plan-bailout-coal-and-nuclear#stream/0 [https://perma.cclYSB6-NIEL].
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* Heightened threats of cyber-attacks against critical
energy infrastructure and natural disasters; and
* Military defense, as some power plants qualifying for
aid would arguably be essential for keeping critical
military installations online in a widespread grid
blackout.14
The essential finding underlying the Proposal is that "[decent and
announced retirements of fuel-secure electric generation capacity
across the continental United States are undermining the security
of the electric power system because the system's resilience
depends on those resources."'5
The solution identified in the DOE Military Proposal was to
use a twenty-four-month period to conduct additional analyses to
gain a more detailed understanding of location-specific security
vulnerabilities in the nation's energy system.1 6 During this time
period of comprehensive testing, the DOE would exercise its
powers under the Defense Production Act and Section 202(c) of the
Federal Power Act to temporarily delay retirements of "fuel-
secure" generation resources.17 This would be accomplished by
requiring grid operators8 to buy or arrange for the purchase of
power from these "Subject Generation Facilities" over a 24-month
period to the extent necessary to "forestall any further actions
toward retirement, decommissioning or deactivation of such
facilities."19 The continued generation and delivery of electric
energy under existing or recent contractual arrangements with the
serving electric utilities would be required for Subject General
Facilities operating outside of the ISO/RSO regions.20 These
"Subject Generation Facilities" were not identified in the Proposal;
industry press at the time speculated that such a designation could
be based on a list of coal and nuclear plants that have declared an
14 See id. at 2-3.
'6 Id. at 2.
16 See id. at 1, 3.
17 See id. at 36-39.
18 See id. generally (explaining Regional Independent System Operators (ISOs) or
Regional Transmission Organizations (RTOs), such as PJM, ISO-New England, New York
ISO, Electric Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT), Mid-Continent ISO, and California
ISO).
9 McKim, supra note 13, at 3.
2 0Id.
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intention to retire, as published by Energy Information
Administration. This list consists of seven nuclear reactors and
seventy-one coal-fired generators, totaling about twenty-five GW
(summertime generating capacity).21
B. Other Proposals to Address Retirement of Coal and Nuclear
Plants
Prior to the "release" of the DOE Military Proposal,
policymakers and regulators in the electric industry raised general
concerns about the inability of coal and nuclear units to survive in
the competitive wholesale electricity markets.22 Wholesale power
prices had been on a steady decline since shale gas development in
the late 2000s began producing cheap and plentiful natural gas
resources, which led to construction of highly efficient natural-gas
fired generating units, as well as the conversion of coal-fired units
to burn natural gas.2 3 In more recent years, the declining cost of
renewable resources-utility-scale solar and wind generation-
also contributed to the downward trend24 in wholesale electricity
prices, and increased difficulty for coal and nuclear units to
compete successfully in the capacity markets operated by the
regional grid operators.2 5
In contrast to coal plants, however, nuclear plants benefit
from strong public policy support, given the vast amounts of base-
load carbon-free generation they produce.26 States with aggressive
goals to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions in order to
address climate change-such as New York's commitment to
achieve an eighty percent reduction in GHG emissions by 2050-
acted quickly to prevent uneconomic nuclear plants from retiring
through adoption of ratepayer-funded subsidies in the form of "zero
21 B. Plumer and N. Popovich, Trump Wants to Bail Out Coal and Nuclear
Power. Here's Why That Will be Hard, N.Y. TIMES (June 13, 2018), https://www.ny-
times.com/interactive/2018/06/13/climate/coal-nuclear-bailout.html
[https://perma.cclU7W9-DDSX].
22 Id.
23 See Appendix C: Wholesale Electricity Price Forecast, NORTHWEST POWER &
CONSERVATION CouNcEi (2006), at C- 12, C- 15, https-//www.nwcouncil.org/sites/de-
faulthfiles/AppendixCElectricity Price_Forecastl1.pdf [https://perma.cclMPS3-8D8K1.
Id. at C-5, C-14 & C-16.
2 Plumer & Popovich, supra note 21.
w Id.
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emission credits" (ZECs).27 Illinois quickly followed New York, and
similar efforts are at various stages of consideration in New Jersey
and Pennsylvania.28 Although coal may enjoy a similar level of
policy support in coal-dependent states such as West Virginia,
Kentucky, and Indiana, policymakers have not aken any action to
provide similar subsidies to enable continued operation of coal-
fired generating plants.29
i. DOE proposal in September 2017
On September 29, 2017, DOE Secretary Rick Perry
submitted a proposed rule to the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission (FERC) pursuant to section 403 of the Federal Power
Act.30 Under the proposal to FERC (DOE Proposal), nuclear and
coal plants generating a ninety-day fuel supply on-site would be
recognized as "reliability and resilience resources," and would be
compensated on a cost-of-service basis with a guaranteed recovery
of operating costs and a profit margin.3 1 Under this approach, the
profitability or financial viability of a unit would not be subject to
the plant's ability to compete in the competitive wholesale
27 New York Regulators Approve Clean Energy Standard with Nuclear Subsidies,
REUTERS (Aug. 1, 2016), https://www.reuters.comlarticle/us-new-york-nuclear-
idUSKCN1OC2Z6 [https://perma.cclLJK8-CTF3].
2 Steven Mufson, Competition Drives Nuclear Industry to Ask for Millions in Sub-
sidies, WASH. POST (May 24, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/businesslecon-
omy/competition-drives-nuclear-industry-to-look-for-millions-in-subsi-
dies/2018/05/24/737e800c-5f60-11e8-a4a4-cO7Oef53f315_story.html?noredi-
rect=on&utm term=.ea393aa997f7 [https://perma.cc/8DGF-LQQL].
2 See cf Tom Eblen, Against Energy Subsidies? Lawmakers Complaining About
Solar Should Dig into This, LEXINGTON HERALD-LEADER (Feb. 09, 2018), https://www.ken-
tucky.com/news/locallnews-columns-blogs/tom-eblenlarticlel99286744.html
[https://perma.cc/4G8U-T3LH]; Rusty Marks, Capito, Manchin Trying to Support Coal-
Fired Power Plants, STATE J. (April 23, 2018), https://www.wvnews.com/statejournal/gov-
ernment/capito-manchin-trying-to-support-coal-fired-power-plants/article_0892ba6-bc94-
5df8-bd2b-Ocf78faafe7a.html [https://perma.cc/983U-D6Z4]; James Taylor, Indiana Utility
Seeks 12Percent Rate Hike to Shut Down Coal Power, HEARTLAND INST. (Dec. 4, 2018),
https://www.heartland.org/news-opinion/news/indiana-utility-seeks- 12 percent-rate-hike-
to-shut-down-coal-power [https://perma.cclH3FE-C78R],
with http://ieefa.org/eia-estimates-show-u-s-coal-production-continuing-to-decline/
[https://perma.ccl4W5F-XYKJ].
3 FED. ENERGY REGULATORY COMM'N, ORDER TERMINATING RULEMAKING PRO-
CEEDING, INITIATING NEW PROCEEDING, AND ESTABLISHING ADDITIONAL PROCEDURES (Jan.
8. 2018), https://www.fere.gov/CalendarFiles/20180108161614-RM18- -000.pdf
[https://perma.cc/KTN3-PBBRI.
31 Id. at 2.
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market.3 2 The DOE Proposal cited significant retirements of
baseload generation (particularly coal and nuclear
plants), discussed the "Polar Vortex" that occurred in 2014 that
purportedly exposed problems with the resilience of the grid, and
asserted that organized wholesale markets failed to compensate
resources for all of the attributes they contribute to the grid,
including resilience.33
The DOE Proposal was unanimously rejected by FERC in
an order issued January 8, 2018.34 In its ruling, FERC determined
that the Proposal failed to satisfy the "clear and fundamental legal
requirements" under Section 206 of the Federal Power Act.35 While
acknowledging the assertions of some commenters that potential
retirements of particular resources are creating grid resilience or
reliability issues, FERC concluded that these allegations failed to
make the required showing of unjustness or unreasonableness of
the existing tariffs.36 On this point, FERC noted the extensive
comments submitted by the RTOs/ISOs that no threat to grid
resilience is posed by past or planned generator retirements.37
FERC similarly determined that the remedy proposed in the DOE
Proposal-allowing all eligible "reliability and resilience
resources" to receive a cost-of-service rate regardless of need or cost
to the system-had not been shown to be just and reasonable, or
not unduly discriminatory or preferential.38 The on-site ninety-day
fuel supply requirement, for example, "would appear to permit
only certain resources to be eligible for the rate, thereby excluding
other resources that may have resilience attributes."39 Although
FERC rejected the Proposal, it commenced a separate docket to
consider the "resilience" issues raised by the Proposal, directing
each RTO and ISO to submit information pertaining to the
resilience of its respective region.40
32 Id.
- Id. at 8.
3 Id. at 1.
3 Id. at 8.
- FED. ENERGY REGULATORY COMM'N, ORDER TERMINATING RULEMAKING PRO-
CEEDING, INITIATING NEW PROCEEDING, AND ESTABLISHING ADDITIONAL PROCEDURES, 10
(Jan. 8. 2018), https://www.ferc.gov/CalendarFiles/20180108161614-RM18-1-000.pdf
[https://perma.cc/KTN3-PBBR].
37 Id.
8 Id.
3 Id. at 9-10.
4 Id. at 10.
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ii. FirstEnergy Solutions' March 29, 2018 request
On March 29, 2018, shortly after FERC's rejection of the
DOE Proposal, FirstEnergy Solutions submitted a letter to DOE
Secretary Rick Perry asking him to make a finding that an
emergency condition existed within the footprint of PJM-a
finding that would require him to issue an Emergency Order under
Section 202(c) of the Federal Power Act.4 1 FirstEnergy Solutions
sought a remedy that would direct PJM to enter into contracts with
certain existing nuclear and coal-fired generators, under which
plant owners would receive "full cost recovery," including
operating expenses, costs of capital and debt, and a fair return on
equity and investment.4 2 Eligible generators were defined as
nuclear and coal-fired generators having an on-site fuel supply
sufficient to allow twenty-five days of operation at full output that
do not recover any of their capital or operating costs through
regulated rates (i.e., the proposal would be limited to merchant
plants).43 Included within the scope of the proposal are three
nuclear and two coal-fired plants owned by FirstEnergy Solutions
with a total nameplate generating capacity of 9,769 megawatts
(MW).44
Secretary Perry did not act on the request, and FirstEnergy
Solutions (along with its subsidiaries) filed for bankruptcy with the
U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Ohio in Akron
two days later, on March 31, 2018.45
iii. October 2018 Proposal from National Coal Council
By a letter dated April 7, 2018, Secretary Perry asked the
National Coal Council to develop a white paper "assessing
opportunities to optimize the existing U.S. coal-fired power plant
1I Letter from Rick C. Giannantonio, General Counsel, FirstEnergy Solutions
Corp., to Rick Perry, Sec'y of Energy, U.S. Dep't of Energy 1 (Mar. 29, 2018), https://state-
powerproject.files.wordpress.com/2018/03/fes-202c-application.pdf [https://perma.cclK8QP-
LBSM].
42 Id. at 31.
Id.
Id. at Attachments A and C.
4,5 FIRST ENERGY SOLUTIONS, RESTRUCTURING INFORMATION (Mar. 13, 2019),
https://www.fes.com/content/fes/home/restructuring.html [https://perma.cc/7LJS-4L4W.
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fleet to ensure a reliable and resilient electricity system."46 The
National Coal Council responded on October 22, 2018 with Power
Reset: Optimizing the Existing Coal Fleet to Ensure a Reliable and
Resilient Grid, which argues that coal-fired power plants need to
be compensated for grid resilience and reliability.
47 Power Reset
calls for both "market reforms" at FERC, as well as regulatory
reforms. The market reforms include capacity market reforms,
electricity price formation refinements, reliability standards and
resilience assessments. The regulatory reforms include EPA's new
Affordable Clean Energy rule and an overhaul of the Clean Air
Act's New Source Review rules governing emissions from new and
modified power plants.48
iv. Recent action with respect o PJM capacity markets
FERC issued an Order on June 29, 2018 adjudicating
allegations from PJM region generators that the then-current
tariff governing PJM's capacity market was unjust, unreasonable,
and unduly discriminatory.4 9 At issue was "out-of-market
payments" provided or required by certain states to support the
entry or continued operation of preferred generating resources-
primarily zero carbon resources such as renewable generation
(wind and solar) as well as nuclear-that may not otherwise be
able to succeed in a competitive wholesale capacity market.
50 The
proceeding is relevant to this analysis because coal plants do not
benefit from such out-of-market payments, leaving coal plant
operators disadvantaged by the payments made to competing
46 Letter from Rick Perry, Sec'y of Energy, U.S. Dep't of Energy, to Greg Workman,
Chairman, National Coal Council 14 (April 7, 2018), https://www.nationalcoalcoun-
cil.org/studies/2018/NCC-Power-Reset-2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/DU4Q-CT7J.
17 Letter from Deck Slone, Chairman, National Coal Council, to Rick Perry, Sec'y
of Energy, U.S. Dep't of Energy 11 (Oct. 22, 2018), https://www.nationalcoalcouncil.org/stud-
ies/2018/NCC-Power-Reset-2018.pdf [https://perma.cclDU4Q-CT7J].
48 NATIONAL COAL COUNCIL, POWER RESET: OPTIMIZING THE EXISTING COAL
FLEET TO ENSURE A RELIABLE AND RESILIENT GRID 3-4,36--38 (2018), https://www.national-
coalcouncil.org/studies/2018/NCC-Power-Reset-2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/DU4Q-CT7J].
4 FED. ENERGY REGULATORY COMM'N, ORDER REJECTING PROPOSED TARIFF REVI-
SIONs, GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART COMPLAINT, AND INSTITUTING PROCEEDING
UNDER SECTION 206 OF THE FEDERAL POWER ACT, 163 FERC 1 61,236 (June 29, 2018),
https://www.ferc.gov/CalendarFiles/20180629212349-EL16-49-0
00 .pdf
[https://perma.cc/KKK9-CQ9P].
5o Id. at 3.
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suppliers in the PJM region.5' In its June 29 Order, FERC found
that "states have provided or required meaningful out-of-market
support to resources in the current PJM capacity market, and that
such support is projected to increase substantially in the future."52
Because these subsidies allow resources to suppress capacity
market clearing prices, FERC concluded that the rate was unjust
and unreasonable under Section 206 of the Federal Power Act, and
commenced a proceeding to consider a just and reasonable
replacement rate.53 On October 2, 2018, PJM responded by filing
two different options for FERC's consideration.5 4 Under both
proposals, PJM would remove state-subsidized resources from the
capacity market and institute a strict price floor for resources that
remain.55
III. LEGAL AUTHORITY FOR THE DOE MILITARY PROPOSAL
In support of the proposition that the DOE has "national
security responsibilities," the DOE Military Proposal notes that
the Secretary of Energy is a member of the National Security
Council, and that the agency has been "charged with responding to
energy supply disruptions and other threats to the reliability and
resilience of the Nation's electric power system."56 With respect to
specific statutory authority to support the DOE Military Proposal,
the addendum cites two statutes in particular: (1) the Defense
Production Act of 195057 and (2) Section 202(c) of the Federal
Power Act.5 8 These statutes, and the precedent hereunder, are
discussed in the following two sections.
51 Id. at 7 & 42.
52 Id. at 63.
53 Id. at 63-64.
51 Initial Submission of PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., Docket Nos. EL16-49-000
(October 2, 2018), https://www.pjm.com/-/medialdocuments/ferc/fings/2018/20181002-ca-
pacity-reform-filing-w0172181x8DF47.ashx [https://perma.cc/YBN7-ZCM7].
55 Id.
5 McKim, supra note 13.
5750 U.S.C. § 4501, et seq. (2007).
58 Codified in 16 U.S.C. § 824a (c)(2015).
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A. Defense Production Act of 1950
The Defense Production Act of 1950 was enacted during the
Korean War to authorize the federal government to order
producers to sell strategic products to the military.5 9 Its purpose
was "to ensure the vitality of the domestic industrial base."
60 In
essence, it allows the DOE to nationalize energy infrastructure in
wartime if necessary to support the war effort. It was amended in
1980 to include energy as a "strategic and critical material."6 1
Under Section 101(a) of the Defense Production Act, the
President is "authorized (1) to require that performance under
contracts or orders . .. which he deems necessary or appropriate to
promote the national defense shall take priority over performance
under any other contract or order, and, for the purpose of assuring
such priority, to require acceptance and performance of such
contacts or orders in preference to other contracts or orders by any
person he finds to be capable of their performance, and (2) to
allocate materials, services and facilities in such manner, upon
such conditions, and to such extent as he shall deem necessary or
appropriate to promote the national defense."62 Section 101(c) of
the Defense Production Act, in turn, empowers the president by
rule or order "to require the allocation of, or the priority
performance under contracts or orders . . . relating to, materials,
equipment, and services in order to maximize domestic energy
supplies."6 3 Before exercising such authority, the president must
find that such materials, services, and facilities are "scarce, critical
and essential" (1) to maintain or expand exploration, production,
refining, transportation, (2) to conserve energy supplies; or (3) to
construct or maintain energy facilities."6 4 The president must also
make the further finding that "maintenance or expansion of
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43767, THE DEFENSE PRODUCTION ACT OF 1950: HIs-
TORY, AUTHORITIES, AND CONSIDERATIONS FOR CONGRESS 2 (Nov. 20, 2018).
0 50 U.S.C. § 4502(a)(2) (2007).
61 It is worth noting that Declaration of Policy also includes a finding that "to
further assure the adequate maintenance of the domestic industrial base, to the maximum
extent possible, domestic energy supplies should be augmented through reliance on renew-
able energy sources (including solar, geothermal, wind, and biomass sources), more efficient
energy storage and distribution technologies, and energy conservation measures." Id. at
(a)(6).
. 50 U.S.C. § 4511(a) (2009).
- Id. at (c).
- Id. at (c)(2)(A).
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exploration, production, refining, transportation, or conservation
of energy supplies or the construction and maintenance of energy
facilities cannot reasonably be accomplished without exercising
[this] authority."6 5
DOE used the Defense Production Act in January 2001
during the California energy crisis.6 6 DOE Secretary Bill
Richardson issued a temporary emergency order requiring twenty-
seven energy suppliers to provide Pacific Gas & Electric (PG&E)
with natural gas after the utility claimed that six of its suppliers
had either stopped or were threatening to halt deliveries because
of PG&E's financial condition.6 7 The order required certain
existing gas suppliers to continue to sell natural gas to PG&E
under the previous terms.6 8 It was extended for two weeks by new
DOE Secretary Spencer Abraham upon the request of then-
California Governor Gray Davis.6 9 Upon its expiration, there were
no further extensions.70
B. Section 202(c) of the Federal Power Act
Section 202(c) of the Federal Power Act requires a
declaration by the Secretary of Energy that "an emergency
exists."7 1 The statute refers to "a sudden increase in the demand
for electric energy, or a shortage of electric energy or of facilities
for the generation or transmission of electric energy."72
Section 202(c) has been used successfully eight times
between 2000 and 2017, under very limited situations and
circumstances:
6 Id. at (c)(2)(B).
66 See generally, McKim, supra note 13, at 35-36; see also CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
supra note 59, at 9.
7 See CONG. RESEARCH SERV., supra note 59, at 9, n. 52.
68 The California Energy Crisis and Use of the Defense Production Act, Hearing
Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 107 Cong. 215 (Feb. 9,
2001)(prepared statement of Eric J. Fygi, acting general counsel of the DOE).
69 U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, TIMELINE OF EvENTs: 2001, https://www.en-
ergy.gov/management/office-management/operational-management/history/doe-history-
timeline/timeline-events-4 [https://perma.cc/RB58-T3531.
70 Id.
71 Codified at 16 U.S.C. § 824a (c)(1) (2015).
72 Id.
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* December 2000: During the California energy crisis,
certain entities were required to sell energy to the
California Independent System Operator (CAISO);73
* August 2002: The New York Independent System
Operator (NYISO) and Independent System
Operator of New England (ISO-NE) were authorized
to require the operation of Cross Sound Cable to
address an electricity shortage on Long Island;74
* August 2003: NYISO and ISO-NE were authorized
to require the operation of Cross Sound Cable to
address the widespread blackout that occurred in
the Northeast;75
* September 2005: In response to Hurricane Katrina,
CenterPoint Energy was required to connect
Entergy Gulf States to serve Texas;76
* December 2005: Mirant was directed to operate
Potomac River generating station to meet reliability
standards in the District of Columbia;77
* September 2008: In response to Hurricane Ike,
CenterPoint Energy was required to connect
Entergy Gulf States to serve Texas;78
* April 2017: Grand River Dam Authority was
authorized to operate Unit 1 at Grand River Energy
Center - a generating unit not in compliance with
EPA's Mercury and Air Toxic Standards (MATS) to
provide reactive power;7 9 and
* June 2017: Authorizing PJM to dispatch Dominion
Energy Virginia's Yorktown Units 1 and 2 (non-
compliant with MATS) as necessary to meet
reliability needs.80
3Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, supra
note 68 (statement from Chairman Sen. Phil Gramm).
74 U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, ORDER NO. 202-02-1 (Aug. 16, 2002).
75U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, ORDER NO. 202-03-1 (Aug. 14, 2003).
76 U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, ORDER NO. 202-05-1 (Sept. 28, 2005).
7 U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, ORDER NO. 202-05-3 (Aug. 14, 2003), at 10.
78U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, ORDER No. 202-08-01 (Sept. 14, 2008).
79U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, ORDER No. 202-17-1 (April 14, 2017), at 2.
8 U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, ORDER No. 202-17-2 (June 16, 2007).
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C. Presence of Circumstances Justifying the Exercise ofAuthority
Filings and reports by the relevant authorities on the issue
of reliability and resilience do not support the suggestion that an
emergency exists, or that there is a basis for exercising authority
under either the Defense Production Act or Section 202(c) of the
Federal Power Act. For example, in a staff report to the Secretary
on Electricity Markets and Reliability issued in August 2017
regarding the DOE Study on Grid Reliability, DOE staff found that
the grid has become more reliable in the last fifteen years-
notwithstanding coal and nuclear retirements.8 1 Or, as the DOE
report explained in technical terms, "at the end of 2016, the system
had more dispatchable capacity capable of operating at high
utilization rates than it did in 2002."82 Similarly, in a study issued
in March 2017- titled "PJM's Evolving Resource Mix and System
Reliability"-PJM concluded that "the expected near-term
resource portfolio is among the highest-performing portfolios and
is well equipped to provide the generator reliability attributes."8 3
PJM further found that while the decline in coal and nuclear
generation would result in decreases in the generator reliability
attributes of frequency response, reactive capability and fuel
assurance, as well as flexibility and ramping attributes would
increase.84 Although operational reliability declines for portfolios
with significantly increased amounts of wind and solar capacity,
PJM found that it "could maintain reliability with unprecedented
levels of wind and solar resources, assuming a portfolio of other
resources that provides a sufficient amount of reliability
services."85 Finally, the North American Electricity Reliability
Corporation (NERC) found in its State of Reliability 2018 report
that the nation's bulk power system "provided an adequate level of
reliability during 2017."86
"I DOE STAFF REPORT, supra note 6, at 68.
82 Id. at 63.
a PJM, PJM's Evolving Resource Mix and System Reliability 4 (March 30, 2017),
https://www.pjm.com/-/media/library/reports-notices/special-reports/20170330-pjms-evolv-
ing-resource-mix-and-system-reliability.ashx [https://perma.cc/A2DV-6FTF].
84 Id. at 5.
8 Id.
8 NORTH AMERICAN ELECTRIC RELIABILITY CORPORATION, STATE OF RELIABILITY
2018, at vi (2018), https:/www.nerc.com/palRAPA/PA/Performance%2OAnaly-
sis%20DL/NERC_2018_SOR_06202018_Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/3YN5-PDR7.
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In addition, five of the seven grid operators nationwide
expressed no short- or long-term resilience concerns in their FERC
docket filings addressing resilience issues and urged an approach
to the resilience issue suggested by DOE. 87 The Western Electricity
Coordinating Council (WECC), for example, recommended
strengthening reliance on gas resources and continuing
investment in more renewable energy, demand response and dual-
fuel capacity.88 The New England ISO, for its part, recommended
stronger, explicit authority to keep particular plants in operation
to back up the grid.89 PJM urged the adoption of federal rules
requiring gas pipelines to provide more information on their
operations that affect fuel supplies for power plants.9 0 With respect
to the DOE Military Proposal in particular, PJM issued a
statement on June 1, 2018 stating that "there is no immediate
threat to system reliability" rising from planned deactivations of
certain nuclear plants.9 1 According to the statement, "[Markets
have helped to establish a reliable grid with historically low
prices," and "[a]ny federal intervention in the market to order
customers to buy electricity from specific power plants would be
damaging to the markets and therefore costly to consumers."
92
IV. THE LIKELY IMPACT OF THE DOE MILITARY PROPOSAL,
IF IMPLEMENTED
If formally proposed and implemented by DOE, the DOE
Military Proposal would impose economic costs in the form of
payments to coal and nuclear plant operators that would otherwise
cease operating because of their high costs. It would also affect the
operation of the competitive wholesale markets and potentially
increase retail electricity prices, depending upon how the cost of
87 Id.
8 Peter Behr, Invoking National Security in the Resilience Debate, E&E NEWS
(June 27, 2018), https://www.eenews.net/energywire/stories/
106 0 086 5 7 1
[https://perma.cc/HDL6-KN7H].
8 Id.
9 Id.
9' Press Release, PJM Interconnection LLC, PJM Statement on Potential Depart-
ment of Energy Market Intervention (June 1, 2018), https://www.pjm.com//medialabout-
pjm/newsroom/2018-releases/20180601-pjm-statement-on-potential-doe-market-interven-
tion.ashx [https://perma.cc/5WJ9-PQFE].
9 Id.
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operating these plants is recovered. These impacts are discussed
in turn below.
A. Economic Costs
i. Brattle Group study
In July 2018, the Brattle Group released a study estimating
the cost of the DOE Military Proposal.93 The Brattle Group study
was requested by the Advanced Energy Economy, with funding
from the American Petroleum Institute, the American Wind
Energy Association, the Electricity Consumers Resource Council,
the Electric Power Supply Association, and the Natural Gas
Supply Association.94
In the absence of any information regarding how the DOE
would select the Subject Generation Facilities or the decision
criteria that would determine eligibility, the Brattle Group study
used two different approaches. The first assumed that the policy
would apply to all coal and nuclear plants currently operating in
the United States (235.8 GW of coal and 99.1 GW of nuclear).
Assuming these units were given an out-of-market annual
payment of $50 per kilowatt (kW) of capacity-roughly the average
operating shortfall for plants that operate at a deficit-that would
imply a direct cost of $16.7 billion dollars annually.9 5 A second, less
expensive and less uniform approach would attempt to tailor out-
of-market payments to exactly cover estimated operating
shortfalls." The Brattle Group estimated that coal and nuclear
plants currently experience operating shortfalls representing a
total capacity between 226.6 and 297.4 GW.9 7 Under this approach,
annual payments would be in the range of $43 to $58 per KW and
the cost of the Proposal would be between $9.7 and $17.2 billion
per year.
9 THE BRATTLE GROUP, THE COST OF PREVENTING BASELOAD RETIREMENTS: A
PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION OF THE DOE MEMORANDUM 1 (2018),
https://info.aee.net/hubfs/Brattle AEEFinalEmbargoed_7.19.18.pdf
[https://perma.cc/EJZ5-MfHH9.
9 Id.
9 Id. at 2.
96 Id.
9 Id.
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The Brattle Group also estimated costs assuming the
financial support formula under the Proposal includes a return on
invested capital rather than merely covering operating deficits.
9 8
Under this scenario, the cost of out-of-market payments would be
substantially greater-between $20 and $35 billion per year.9 9
ii. Energy Ventures Analysis study
Energy Ventures Analysis performed a separate study that
was funded by the National Mining Association.10 0 This study was
limited to examining three large coal-fired plants operating in the
PJM region (Pleasants Station, Sammis, and Bruce Mansfield).
According to this study, the subsidies necessary to keeping these
plants operating would cost $130 million per year.'0 ' If the plants
ceased operating, on the other hand, "the study estimated that the
cost of power in the PJM market would increase by $2.0 billion
annually due to increased energy and capacity market prices."
102
The study concluded that to provide the PJM power market with
the same amount of capacity and energy, merchant power
generators would need to replace the three coal plants with 5,258
MW of gas-fired Combined Cycle Gas Turbines (CCGT) plants, at
a capital cost of $5.7 billion. 0 3
B. Impact on Operation of Wholesale Energy Markets
The DOE Military Proposal, if implemented, would cause
serious distortion in highly competitive wholesale power markets
by allowing continued operation of plants that are otherwise
unable to compete under existing market designs. Plants that are
"out of the money"-failing to clear the periodic capacity auctions
in PJM for example-will typically be unable to continue operating
because the gap between costs of operation and revenues from
9 Id.
0 Id.
100 ENERGY VENTURES ANALYSIS, IMPACT OF COAL PLANT RETIREMENTS ON THE
U.S. POWER MARKETS - PJM INTERCONNECTION CASE STUDY 2 (2018), https://nma.org/wp-
content/uploads/2018/07/EVA-Report-on-Coal-Plant-Retirements-f inal.pdf
[https://perma.ccl8UG4-JCMW1.
101 Id.
102Id.
103 Id.
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6nergy sales is too great.104 Upon their closure, the market-clearing
price will typically be higher as a matter of simple economics: a
reduction in supply leads to higher prices for the remaining
suppliers. If the plants are able to continue operating as a result of
a DOE-imposed requirement that grid operators make
arrangements to purchase their output, however, market prices
will be depressed. This clearly harms un-subsidized power
suppliers such as natural gas-fired generators,0 5 which explains
the strong opposition to the DOE Military Proposal from the
American Petroleum Institute, the Natural Gas Supply
Association, and the American Wind Energy Association, which
provided funding for the Brattle Group Study.
C. Impact on Retail Electricity Prices
If ISOs/RTOs are required to enter into contractual
arrangements to keep uneconomic power plants operating, the
costs need to be recovered somewhere. While the details of cost
recovery are unclear, these operating costs would likely be rolled
into the revenue requirement of the ISOs/RTOs, which are passed
on to retail electric customers through transmission rates charged
within the various wholesale regions.106
OBSERVATIONS & CONCLUSIONS
It is not surprising that the DOE Military Proposal has not
yet been (and likely never will be) formally advanced by the Trump
Administration.0 7 The legal authority relied upon for the Proposal
likely does not provide a lawful basis for the proposed action under
existing circumstance in the electric industry.
First, there is no "grid emergency" under Section 202(c) of
the Federal Power Act. Most of the studies on grid resilience and
reliability conclude that there is no problem. Rather, the grid is
becoming more resilient with increasingly firm natural gas
104 Id. at 6.
'0 Id. at 4.
-n See, e.g., Energy Ventures Analysis supra note 100, at 6.
'0 Hannah Northey, 'Poorly Articulated' DOE Grid Plan Stalls - Source, E&E
NEWS (Oct. 16, 2018), https://www.eenews.net/stories/1060102675 [https://perma.cc/E4Z8-
DKMA].
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transportation arrangements (as wholesale pipelines are
completed and rules for capacity markets are toughened) and
declining costs of wind, utility-scale solar and battery storage.
Second, the United States is not engaged in a wartime conflict that
would warrant use of the Defense Production Act. 108 Although the
Executive Branch may be accorded considerable deference for its
actions upon the claim of a "national security" concern, that
deference is not likely to be sufficient to overcome the legal
infirmities of using these relatively obscure provisions to impose a
radical upending of the competitive wholesale markets in the
United States.1" The reductions in wholesale electricity prices
from low-cost natural gas and competitive wind and solar
resources have ultimately flowed through in retail rates to produce
lower electricity prices for consumers, and FERC can be expected
to resist measures that would distort these markets and imperil
the economic benefits that electricity customers throughout the
country are receiving.
Apart from the legal infirmities, the Proposal seems unwise
as a matter of public policy. It creates clear implications as far as
"picking winners and losers" in the electric industry and upsetting
competitive wholesale markets that otherwise are operating well
and producing benefits for consumers. Moreover, it is not clear
there is adequate public support for such a major disruption on
behalf of a limited subset of power providers. As noted above,
nuclear plant operators are receiving subsidies through state
programs given the benefits they provide in the form of zero-carbon
baseload generation.110 Renewable energy sources similarly enjoy
the benefits of procurement obligations imposed under state
renewable portfolio standards, due largely to the zero carbon
attributes of these resources."' Coal plants enjoy no similar
support, given their role as the largest contributor to GHG
emissions of any electric generating resource.112 As the number of
miners employed in the coal industry continues to decline, the level
of support from the general public can be expected to decline as
1- 50 U.S.C. § 4502 (2007).
109 Id.
110 See NYRegulators, supra note 27.
11 Plumer & Popovich, supra note 21.
112 EPA, Sources of Greenhouse Gas Emissions, Electricity Sector Emissions,
available at https://www.epa.gov/ghgemissions/sources-greenhouse-gas-emissions.
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well, with the exception of coal-dependent states such as West
Virginia, Kentucky and Wyoming.113 So President Trump's
promise to "bring the coal jobs back" is likely a campaign promise
that will not be fulfilled, absent statutory changes that would carry
the force of law in a FERC proceeding.
113 Bill Estep, Trump Promised to Put Coal Miners Back to Work. Kentucky has
Fewer Coal Jobs Now, LEXINGTON HERALD-LEADER (November 9, 2018), https://www.ken-
tucky.com/news/state/article221408290.html [https://perma.cc/EL5S-FEE7.
